Hello everyone, this is my first foray into an online forum.  Last spring, I completed a thesis concerning Dayton's local representational democracy and would like to share parts of it with the forum.  My research focused primarily on Dayton and Cincinnati.  Some of my non-published research will be shared as well.

 

Ohio is a unique case politically.  Because of home rule, city-county mergers are difficult (only Summit County/Akron is the only merged government) and state-imposed regionalism is out of the question.

 

Ohio has a host of problems because of its geographic location and historical development.  Ohio is Rust Belt and Midwest, Great Lakes and Upland South, very rural and very urban, neither red nor blue.  If Freud were to analyze Ohio, he would discover a state with neither a healthy ego nor superego, but animated by a raging, self-destructive id.  In a word, Ohio is chaos.

 

The plethora of metro and micropolitan areas around the state that boomed during the Industrial Revolution are now dying because of the problems associated with the Rust Belt.  Urban cores are turning into no man's lands of crime and poverty.  Any retail left in downtown shopping areas can hardly compete with their suburban competitors.  Cities are no longer family friendly.  And families are no longer city friendly.  Rural land that is cultivated for agricultural purposes is being devoured by sprawl and Ohio's farmers are feeling the pain.  The state government is wallowing in a tit for tat political game that leaves the Governor's hands tied. 

 

But there is hope too.  Each city has its remnant that still believes.  Those few chivalric knights of Ohio who understand the problems their cities face and the remedies for them.  Even scattered throughout suburbia the cities have their allies.  Transplants from across the country and around the world call Ohio home.  Tens of thousands of college students come to Ohio every year to live and learn.  With a Great Lake to the north, a mighty river to the south, forested woodland to the southeast, rivers crisscrossing the state and peaceful countryside separating Ohio's sorority of cities, the state has no need to be ashamed of its natural resources.  With the excellent resources each city has inherited from its proud past, Ohio boasts exceptional libraries, arts and cultural amenities, as well as park systems.  Ohio has worthy resources, but are we worthy of them?  Can we build a New Ohio in a New Midwest that is proud to have shed its Rust Belt roots and ready to proclaim itself as a leader in the Great Lakes region and in the country?

 

If Ohio can capitalize on its cities instead of blaming its problems on them, it has the potential to lead the nation again.

 

Coalitions between urban and rural representatives must be formed to end a common enemy: sprawl.

 

City Halls throughout Ohio's large cities must be empowered to confront the challenges they face.  Why are city halls weak and how can they be strengthened?

 

 

 

 

I would like your feedback as I post some of my research, piecemeal.

Dayton: “Beyond the point of no return”?

 

Dayton, Ohio is “beyond the point of no return” according to Cities without Suburbs by David Rusk, former mayor of Albuquerque and international consultant on urban policy. To be considered past the point of no return, a city must:

• Have lost more than 20 percent of its population since its peak

o Dayton in 2000 had lost 37 percent of its residents since 1960

• Have a disproportionate share of minorities compared with the suburbs

o In 2000, Dayton had more than five times the number of  minorities in comparison to suburbs.

• Have an average income level less than 70 percent of that of its suburbs.

o In 1999, Dayton’s average income was 66 percent of its suburbs.1

 

Dayton certainly fits Rusk’s portrait of a city beyond the point of no return.  What are the implications for the tens of thousands of city of Dayton residents?  The same question pertains to the hundreds of thousands who live in the Dayton region.

In Rusk’s Inside Game/Outside Game, he admitted that “Cities without Suburbs was just a wake-up call.”2  Indeed, hearing that your city is beyond the point of no return serves as a great wake up call.  The “inside game” from the title of his book refers to all variations of initiatives designed to combat poverty within a city.  He determines “that playing only the ‘inside game’ is a losing strategy for even the most exemplary players…even the strongest inside game must be matched by a strong ‘outside game.’”3  The latter half of his book’s title concerns itself with three primary policies aimed at aiding central cities in the Northeast and Midwest that cannot mirror the “elastic” cities of the Sunbelt and Northwest.  An elastic city according to Rusk is a city that can defend itself against sprawl.  His three-pronged agenda:

 

1. To help control sprawl, require regional land use planning.

2. To help dissolve concentrations of poverty, ensure that all suburbs have their fair share of low- and moderate-income housing.

3. To help reduce fiscal disparities, implement regional revenue sharing.4

 

These recommendations constitute his “outside game.”  Whether his particular agenda ought to be implemented is open to debate, but his recognition and insistence on a reform movement in the central cities of the United States cannot be ignored.

Since reform is undoubtedly needed, who ought to lead the reform movement?  Rusk cites the extraordinary support foundations can lend to regional agendas, but they cannot lead: “A foundation’s activities must be undertaken with a view to providing the public with information about the issues…Foundations cannot fill the leadership gap.”5 Rusk identifies mayors as “Missing in (In) Action” and that the “leadership gap is not being filled by big city mayors.”6

Leadership in Urban Politics

 

Managers think about today. Leaders think about tomorrow.

 

Bernard Bass explains that “leadership is often regarded as the single most critical factor in the success or failure of institutions.”7  Although perhaps not the single most important factor, leadership is crucial to the sustainability of inelastic, economically distressed cities of the Midwest and Northeast.  Additionally, in Stone’s “Political leadership in urban politics,” mayoral leadership occurs when mayors are change agents and “impact on the flow events” in such a way that “something happens that would otherwise not take place.”

 

But what ought we to do if mayors are merely figureheads?  The answer is obvious: redefine them as something more.  Later I'll show you how Cincinnati changed its governmental structure in the 1990s and why I believe it is time cities around the state should do the same thing.  After that I'll address charter counties such as Summit County.

Sorry, this should probably be in a Politics section.  :|

This is great stuff Seth. I'm looking forward to your next posts, especially those concerning Dayton and Cincinnati.

The following is an excerpt from Kettering Foundation paper titled: "Can Communities Reach Consensus on Changing the Structure of Local Representative Democracy."

 

CINCINNATI CASE STUDY

 

 

In 1995, the Cincinnati Business Committee, an organization of the largest Cincinnati private sector employers, became concerned about the lack of leadership at Cincinnati City Hall.  The members felt it was time to make major changes in the city structure, the most important being the direct election of a "strong" mayor in Cincinnati.  The Cincinnati Business Committee initiative was generally perceived as being developed in secrecy, and it went directly to the ballot through a petition drive rather than being presented to City Council for its consideration for placement on the ballot.  In addition, the petition was timed to place the issue on an August special election ballot.

 

The Cincinnati Business Committee raised in excess of $350,000 for the campaign through the contributions of fifty businesses.  The opponents of the proposal made a major point of the exclusiveness of the contributions, pointing out that "not a single human being" contributed to the campaign.3  The opponents of the proposal, that included the Democratic Party, the Charter Party, the NAACP, and other community organizations, were able to raise nearly $80,000 to oppose the ballot issue. 

 

At the August election, the proposal failed with sixty-four percent of the voters voting to reject the plan.  The decisive defeat led some to predict that the issue would not be raised for many years to come.

 

Cincinnati Reconsiders

 

 

After the overwhelming defeat in Cincinnati, many still felt that change was needed, and should be pursued.  Cincinnati was one of the few cities in the country not allowing citizens to vote directly for the position of mayor.  Instead, all council seats were up for election every two years.  The candidate for city council receiving the most votes became the mayor.  This system was approved by the voters in 1987 in place of the previous method in which the mayor was selected by a vote of the council members.  The goal was to eliminate the deal making in the mayor selection process.

 

In early 1998, a group of young civic activists began to meet to determine if this issue could again be a part of the public agenda in Cincinnati.  Three early participants in these discussions were: Jeff Berding, a 32-year-old Democrat who had led the successful, voter-approved baseball and football stadium proposal; Patrick DeWine, a 31-year-old Republican and son of U.S. Senator Michael DeWine; and Jonathan Holifield, a 34-year- old NAACP board member and attorney working on civil rights and housing discrimination issues.  The three felt they needed to recruit a group of bipartisan, diverse, and committed colleagues to work with them in pursuing the possibility of this time assuring a true public discussion of the issue of the structure of Cincinnati's local government.8 

 

Eventually they were able to put together a group of about forty individuals.  Local attorneys, campaign organizers, and public relations professionals were the most common professions of those willing to become involved.

 

The group called itself Build Cincinnati.  From the start, Build Cincinnati representatives worked closely with the official leaders of the Republican Party, the Democratic Party, and the NAACP.  Community discussions were held in the spring of 1998 to receive input on issues that would be considered important to members of Cincinnati neighborhoods if another effort at changing the form of local government in Cincinnati were developed.

 

From the early community dialogue, the Build Cincinnati coalition heard the sentiment that the citizens wanted to give additional authority and accountability to the mayor position.  In addition, the citizens felt that the government would be more responsive to their needs if the City Council were elected by districts rather than at-large.

 

 

A Reform Proposal Developed

 

 

Based on this input, Build Cincinnati developed a draft of a strong mayor/council district plan that would set up eight legislative districts.  The city manager position would be modified to a city administrator position appointed by the mayor.  The mayor's position and the eight district council positions would remain non-partisan as established in the Cincinnati Charter. 

 

At this point, Build Cincinnati leaders decided to form a steering committee to take the proposal through the public review and discussion process.9  The steering committee was created with the following membership:

 

Mike Allen, Hamilton County Republican Party Chairman

Tim Burke, Hamilton County Democratic Party Chairman

Milton Hinton, President of the Cincinnati Chapter of NAACP

John Gilligan, Former Ohio Governor and Cincinnati Councilman

Bill Bowen, Former Ohio State Senator

H.C. "Buck Neihoff", Chair of the Republican Party Finance Committee

Eugene Ruehlman, Former Cincinnati Mayor

 

The steering committee made it clear to the community that its members had not taken a position on, or endorsed any part of, the strong mayor/council district plan.  Three community meetings were scheduled for July, 1998 for members of the steering committee to hear from the public on the proposal.  The comments received at the public meetings covered a wide range of viewpoints.  While there was not consensus, there did appear to be the beginning of a consensus that the current system was not working as effectively as it should. 

 

In August, a poll was conducted for Build Cincinnati by Public Opinion Strategies, a polling firm from Alexandria, Virginia.10    The poll contained several interesting results.  First, the poll showed 66 percent in favor of direct election of a mayor with broad executive powers.  Second, the poll showed support of 72 percent for council election from districts.  Buoyed by these results, the Build Cincinnati civic activists began the process of putting the final touches on its proposal to change the system.

 

In November, the Build Cincinnati working group began to lay plans for a fundraising event for getting the plan onto the 1999 primary or general election ballot.  The issue appeared to be gaining momentum as the end of 1998 approached.  With the results of the polling and fundraising going well, Build Cincinnati leaders put forward a second reform plan.  This plan went beyond the strong mayor and council district election proposal by adding three at-large council seats.  Build Cincinnati was ready to move forward in 1999 and ask voters to decide on changing the form of representative democracy in Cincinnati.

 

(cont.)

 

The 'ICMA Issue'

 

 

One key opponent of past efforts to changes in the council-manager plan in Cincinnati was ICMA.  During the 1995 effort by the Cincinnati Business Committee to change the Charter, ICMA members held a press conference in Cincinnati that included past and present city managers from other areas in Ohio and around the country to argue the points in favor of retaining the existing governmental structure.  Their message was one of competence and honesty in the administration of local government. 

 

Knowing that this had been a key factor in the overwhelming defeat of the 1995 ballot issue, the leaders of Build Cincinnati worked with the Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce to arrange a forum that would deal with the "ICMA issue" up front.  Kansas City had been able to walk the tightrope of changing its council-manager plan, receiving the endorsement of retired city managers, avoiding the public opposition of ICMA members.  After reviewing their options, Build Cincinnati and the Chamber put together a forum in late January with the major speaker being Bill Hansell, executive director of ICMA. 

 

In the forum, Hansell reviewed the basis of the council-manager plan and helped the group define the level of power a Cincinnati mayor could have while still fitting the criteria of the council-manager form of government.  As quoted previously in this paper, Hansell, in the December 1998 and January 1999 issues of the organization's magazine Public Management, challenged his members with a two-part series titled "Is it Time to 'Reform' the Reform?"  Hansell reviewed the history of the council-manager plan and its emergence because of "the deplorable condition of American local government, which was best described by words like corruption, bossism, machines, favoritism, and patronage."  He continued:

 

The basic principles of 'The Plan' are articles of religion to the

profession and are reflected in the ICMA Code of Ethics values

of scrupulous honesty and integrity; open, participatory, representative,

and democratic local government; and professional management

committed to continuous improvement and the pursuit of total quality.

The reform moved local government from being the most troubled

element of American democracy to the most trusted.11

 

Clearly, with the members of ICMA seeing their public mission as a type of religion, it was very important to the Build Cincinnati coalition that they deal up front with the "ICMA issue."  But coalition members saw a different attitude in the ICMA executive director as they reviewed the series' message.  Hansell pointed out that the council-manager plan rested on the assumption that councils would follow the professional advice of the manager and resolve conflict through consensus or compromise.  He noted that nationally, city councils in larger, diverse cities are seen as divided on issues where compromise is difficult.  Hansell also pointed out the decline of the citizen volunteer as local elected official.  He stated that full-time or almost full-time elected policymakers create the potential to seriously challenge the separation of function that was contemplated in the original council-manager reform plan.12

 

Again, from the perspective of Build Cincinnati, these statements by the executive director of the organization, which had so successfully argued against the 1995 effort to change the Cincinnati Charter, were possibilities for themes in convincing any skeptical elected officials, wary citizens, or the probing media in trying to build a convincing case for change.

 

In the second of the two-part series, Hansell opened with the following:

 

In the early 18th century, the British poet and satirist Alexander Pope

wrote, 'For forms of government let fools contest: whatever is best

administered is best.'  This would seem to make us a rather foolish

profession as we agonize about the council-manager form of

government in its various manifestations.  We promote adoption and

fight abandonment as if we were defending the faith.13

 

Hansell called on members to look at variations of the council-manager plan by referring to a language change to the title "mayor-council-manager" government.  He reviewed four alternative mayor-council-manager plans that he saw as consistent with the intent of the plan.  He concluded his statement to the members:

 

It would be helpful, I believe, to recognize that we are properly

emphasizing professional management of service delivery in a

variety of democratic forms of organizing local government.  This

recognition would aid in toning down the rhetoric about who is

a "strong" mayor and how dominant a single individual can or

should become in the governance of a community.  After all, our

job is to try to ensure that government services are 'best administered'

for all citizens.  Let's try some new language to cut down on the

intensity of some of our debates and to place our emphasis on the

need for profession management of local government services.14

 

Hansell's statement to his members gave the Build Cincinnati coalition an opportunity to anticipate an issue that hurt the 1995 effort to change the Cincinnati Charter.  Knowing of his articles, Build Cincinnati could be confident that his presentation at the forum would be more along the line of what could be acceptable to ICMA in terms of improved local governance as opposed to past defenses by city managers of the traditional council-manager plan.  In that regard, the forum featuring Hansell's involvement was a success.

 

 

Compromise and Consensus on the Proposal

 

 

But the positive direction of the public discussion was short-lived.  On January 30, the Hamilton County Democratic Party announced that it could not support a plan that included district elections for city council.  Democrats had been successful during the 1990s in winning at-large council elections and maintaining a majority on council, and thus saw no great benefit to their party in such a change. 

 

The environment became even more complicated when Republican Councilman Charlie Winburn proposed his own change to the Cincinnati local government structure.  His proposal was first to change the council term from two years to four years; and second to have the mayor selected by the council rather than the council member receiving the highest votes automatically becoming mayor. 

 

Build Cincinnati saw this proposal as a step backward, and in total opposition to the concept of allowing the voters to create a more accountable city government.  Members of Build Cincinnati and members of the Republican Party interested in allowing the idea of a stronger mayor to be considered by the voters convinced Winburn to withdraw his proposal on the condition that Build Cincinnati would keep working to get as much consensus as possible.  That meant the discussions with the Democratic Party, the NAACP, and the third party in Cincinnati local politics, the Charterites, had to get underway.

 

On February 22, representatives of Build Cincinnati met with the only Charterite on the council, Jim Tarbell, and former Charterite Councilwoman Bobbie Sterne.  In addition, the meeting included the NAACP and the Baptist Ministers Conference.  To assist in the discussions, John Williams, president of the Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce, attended the meeting.  The Democrats had made it clear that they were opposed to district council elections, and this position was supported by the Charterites.  Additionally, the Charterites wanted to ensure that the council had some role in directing the work of the city manager. 

 

The NAACP preferred district elections, but was convinced by the leaders of Build Cincinnati that the necessary votes from the Cincinnati City Council could not be gained unless the district election proposal was dropped.  However, Build Cincinnati representatives made it clear in their eventual public announcement that they planned to "revisit" the issue in the future.15

 

Finally, a compromise was developed with the focus on the creation of a stronger mayor.  There would be no district elections in the proposal, no change in council term, and the city manager position would still be accountable to the entire council with the council sharing the responsibility for hiring and firing the manager.

 

Jeff Berding, one of the Build Cincinnati organizers stated, "We gave up a lot to come up with a plan that all segments of the community could live with."16

 

John Williams, Chamber President, had a slightly different perspective.  He commented, "Everybody left the room disappointed, but not upset.  I don't think it's a perfect plan, but I do believe it's better than what we've got and we have to do something."17

 

In early March, Cincinnati City Council voted to put the "stronger mayor" issue on the ballot for a decision by the voters.  As the public discussion entered its final phase, the campaign for the voters' final decision on the issue, community groups made their positions known.  The groups in support included the Republican Party, the Democratic Party, the Charter Party, the NAACP, the AFL-CIO Labor Council, the Cincinnati Federation of Teachers, the Cincinnati Chamber and other business community organizations, and the Cincinnatus Society, a good government association.  Opposition organizations included the Baptist Ministers Conference, the Urban League, the League of Women Voters, the United AutoWorkers, the Building Trades Council, and the Sierra Club.18

 

 

 

Marketing the Proposal

 

 

The Build Cincinnati coalition had made it clear that this was a different process from the 1995 Cincinnati Business Committee effort, from the creation of the proposal to its marketing.  Clearly, the public discussion and the backing of a number of political organizations and community organizations distinguished the Build Cincinnati proposal.  The coalition was able to show further contrast with the announcement of 350 contributors to the campaign.  An additional marketing contrast was the campaign media development and television time purchase.  In 1995, the Cincinnati Business Committee had used most of its $350,000 campaign budget on media advertising.  The Build Cincinnati coalition spent only $80,000 on television advertising, and created just one commercial to be aired.19  This was an important distinction in their analysis, and important in their defense should there be an attempt to tie them to the 1995 effort of the business community.

 

Build Cincinnati stepped aside to allow a group titled Coming Together for Cincinnati to run the campaign.  Aaron Herzig became campaign manager for Coming Together for Cincinnati.  Interestingly, Herzig led the campaign against the Cincinnati Business Committee's 1995 ballot issue.  At the campaign kickoff, the Cincinnati mayor, several Cincinnati Council members, former mayors and council members, and a former Ohio governor were on hand to publicly show the broad-based coalition in support of the proposed charter change. 

 

During the sixty days leading up to the charter vote, voices of opposition were raised.  Councilman Tyrone Yates served as the focal point for opponents.  His message was simple.  The proposed charter change would put future mayors under the control of special interests, particularly the business community.  Yates pointed out that five companies -- Cinergy, Fifth Third Bank, Cincinnati United Contractors, Federated Department Stores, and Procter&Gamble -- had paid $25,000 for polling to assist the proponents, and that was just an example of the ways in which the business community would upset the balance of power in Cincinnati.20  African-Americans make up about forty percent of the population in Cincinnati, and Yates, an African-American himself, tried to convince this large voting population that they could only lose in any change that would concentrate the city's governmental powers.

 

The media's coverage of the public debate on this issue was daily.  News stories covered the proponents' and opponents' position statements.  The Cincinnati Enquirer web page daily posted a question and answer section about the charter change, which was titled "Issue 4."  The Enquirer web page further posted a listing titled "Issue 4: The Good and the Bad."  This offering took the major components in the proposal, such as the mayor's new role in the budget process, the mayor's new veto power, and any changes in the city manager's role, and explained each component, the current situation, and the position of the proponents and opponents on each.

 

While the reporters covered both sides of the debate in a neutral fashion, the editorial pages of the Enquirer, the Cincinnati Post, the Business Courier, and almost every other small newspaper in circulation in the city wrote in support of the proposed change in the powers of the mayor.  The Cincinnati Enquirer, in its endorsement, wrote:

 

Without Issue 4, the city will continue to bicker and dither, hobbling the

city and crippling the region, which both need a strong, accountable

leader who can speak for the urban area that ties all of our communities

together.21

 

David Rusk, in his book, Inside Game/Outside Game: Winning Strategies for Saving Urban America, states:

 

… communities seldom make progress on hard, divisive issues

through friendly, consensual agreement.  They do so by building

political coalitions.  And those coalitions are most durable when

based on each member's political self-interest…22

 

Rusk and the Enquirer editorial staff both see the need for the center city of any region to have a strong leader as the focal point in the creation of any metropolitan area agenda.  Issue 4 provided the framework for such a potential in Cincinnati. 

 

Even proponents of the council-manager plan in Cincinnati Enquirer interviews had to acknowledge the potential improvement in leadership that could come from the structure proposed in Issue 4.  James Svara, head of the Political Science Department at North Carolina State University, in analyzing Cincinnati's existing selection process for the mayor's position, stated, "You have everybody running for mayor every election, so you end up with one mayor and the rest are disgruntled wannabes.  It makes it hard for the mayor to lead."23

 

The vote was held on Tuesday, May 4.  Issue 4 passed with 53 percent in favor, but the turnout was only 18 percent of registered voters.  Chip Gerhardt, one of the original leaders of Build Cincinnati and Manager of Public Strategies for Cinergy Corporation, felt that the story of the campaign was "the fact that Cincinnati came together for the issue - blacks and whites, men and women, Republicans, Democrats and Charterites."24 

 

In responding to the low voter turnout, Mayor Qualls stated, "Obviously, we would like to see more political involvement, but the people who came out had the right to decide the issue."25

 

Representative democracy in Cincinnati will be changed based on the democratic vote of the city's voters.  The 1995 effort of the Cincinnati Business Committee convinced a group of young civic activists that the process was as important as the message in convincing the citizens to support a change in the form of government.  The media and the public were interested in this new group of young leaders who wanted to see change in their city.  These civic activists made it clear to the author in interviews that they intend to stay in Cincinnati, that Cincinnati is their home.  Former Governor John Gilligan, who worked in support of Issue 4, spoke of seeing an important future for the Build Cincinnati leaders:

 

These young people are going to be active in the business and

political life of this community for the next several decades.  If they

continue to put this level of time and energy into it, they're going to

have a significant impact on this city.26

 

Seth, keep 'em comin'

 

Agreed! This excellent background info to provide a context of what going on toda

(cont.)

 

Keep in mind this is a few years old*

 

Lessons Learned

 

 

Strategically, the Build Cincinnati organizers saw that the public's suspicion of the Cincinnati business community required a genuine dialogue in the community.  The exhibit at the end of this paper visually depicts the diversity of the leaders of this effort.  Build Cincinnati was not anti-business, but it did want to learn from the past mistakes of the city's business leaders.  In addition, these young civic activists recognized the need to engage a wide variety of organizations that represent many interests in the Cincinnati community.  Through these citizen organizations -- political, faith-based, business,

civic -- Build Cincinnati tried to achieve a discussion of the frustrations over the way Cincinnati city government was operating.  It also forced consideration of the question of whether a change in the visibility and stature of the position of an elected leader could make a positive difference.

 

Build Cincinnati had observed the citizens' support for the positive aspects of the council-manager form of government -- professionalism in staff, lack of corruption over the years, and business principles in the day-to-day operation of city government.  That was the reason they invited the executive director of ICMA to Cincinnati.  They allowed Bill Hansell to "draw a line in the sand," to specify of how much change could be instituted in the local government while still conforming to the principles of the ICMA council-manger plan.  Build Cincinnati went right up to that line.  That tactical move by Build Cincinnati neutralized a late effort by the Ohio affiliate of ICMA, the Ohio City Management Association, to raise the issue.27  The national organization had, in essence, given at least a reluctant approval to the proposal.

 

 

 

 

 

Media Impact

 

 

The media was an important actor in the community discussion of the charter change.  Build Cincinnati's leaders worked hard from the outset to get the media to see the group as a contrast to the style of the Cincinnati Business Committee leadership.  They succeeded with both the reporting and editorial writers of the Cincinnati newspapers.  The coverage consistently referred to the Build Cincinnati leadership as young, or new to the civic scene.  This assured that the Build Cincinnati organizers would not be confused with the business community's 1995 effort.  The print media also covered all of the community meetings and outreach efforts by Build Cincinnati to various community organizations. 

 

The television news outlets did not give extensive coverage to this community discussion.  The community dialogue and compromise leading to Issue 4 being placed on the ballot did not lend itself to traditional television news coverage, which in Cincinnati is tinged heavily with investigative reporting techniques.  The lack of television news coverage of the process leading up to city council putting the issue before the voters, and the debate during the final month before the vote, could have been one factor in the low voter turnout.

 

 

A New Force for the Future (this subtitle was especially prophetic since many involved with Build Cincinnati now occupy important positions in Ohio from Cleveland to Columbus back to Cincinnati).

 

 

The turnout of 18 percent of the voting population on a beautiful day in Cincinnati was a blemish on the hard work of the Build Cincinnati activists.  These young, diverse, bipartisan Cincinnatians had worked with numerous civic and political organizations to bring back an issue for discussion that had been soundly defeated by the voters.  They were convinced that it was the heavy-handed, aloof manner of certain Cincinnati business leaders that had doomed the earlier effort.  Their genuine effort at community dialogue was indeed impressive.  However, their eventual successful campaign, while effective with organizations representative of the people, and the news media that reports and interprets events for the people, did not successfully energize the voting public in large numbers to make their decision.  Mayor Qualls is correct that the citizens who took the time to vote had the right in a democracy to decide the issue, but after such as effective community discussion process, the turnout was an unexpected statement of disinterest concerning this community discussion by a significant portion of Cincinnati's population.

 

Former Governor Gilligan predicted an active future for the new civic activists of Build Cincinnati.  When interviewed, the organizers claimed to the author that they had not thought about the next issue they might tackle.  They were also unsure of whether their diverse, bipartisan coalition would be able to achieve the same determination to accomplish change on a new agenda.28  However, the credibility of their effort with elected community leaders who would be impacted by a successful Issue 4 vote, the positive coverage -- particularly the editorial coverage -- from the Cincinnati newspapers, and the positive support of so many community organizations, should encourage further civic activity by the citizens working as Build Cincinnati.

 

The Kansas City Experience

 

 

As this paper has outlined, the national discussion of the need for stronger leadership at the local level, and the need for accountability has continued in cities around the country.  Kansas City, Missouri, was another community with a history of council-manager government.  Perry Cookingham, former city manager of Kansas City, outlined in his autobiography the strong support in the community for the position of city manager after the demise of the Pendergast machine.  Yet, in the 1990s there was a feeling that stronger executive leadership was needed in Kansas City.

 

The City of Kansas City, led by Mayor Emanuel Cleaver, put before the voters the issue of a "stronger" mayor that still kept the position of city manager, but did not conform to the traditional council-manager plan.  The Kansas City Star, in its endorsement editorial, stated:

 

This newspaper has established a long tradition of declaiming against

any real or perceived threat to the council-manager form of government

in Kansas City.  The mere thought of having a stronger mayor has sent

shudders through the foundation here at 18th and Grand. 

But it's time for this newspaper and this community to acknowledge a

new reality.  That reality shows that the cities in this country that are

making the most dramatic improvements in their citizens' lives are

led by strong mayors.4

 

The main proponents for this proposal were former mayors Richard L. Berkley and Charles B. Wheeler, and former city managers Robert Kipp and Dave Olson.  Interestingly, Kipp served in the 1980's as president of ICMA.  Only two Kansas City Council members expressed opposition.  The campaign spent $29,000 on getting its message out, with most of the money going for a mailer from the former mayors to citizens stating their endorsement of the proposal.  Contributors included civic groups such as the Civic Council of Greater Kansas City, a traditional supporter of the council-manager form of government.5

 

When the votes were counted, 62.4 percent of the voters had voted to support the change.  Kipp stated that he was surprised that the margin of victory was so large but thought it showed that citizens were looking for stronger political leadership and accountability.6

 

ICMA Executive Director Bill Hansell, in the December 1998 issue of Public Management, four months after the Kansas City vote, wrote:

 

In short, we have reformed almost every element of the original reform

plan to the point where citizens are having a difficult time telling the

difference or, more importantly, what difference form of government

makes!  The cities of Cincinnati, Ohio, and Oakland, California, are facing

the second challenges to the council-manager system in a short, three-year

period, and one of the stalwarts of council-manager government, Kansas

City, Missouri, has recently modified its charter to strengthen the position

of the mayor.

 

Kansas City's mayor now nominates the person who will serve as manager,

receives the budget from the manager before the other councilmembers, and

appoints all citizens to authorities, boards, and commissions.  These reforms

are all consistent with council-manager government as we know it today, but

they would certainly raise the eyebrows of some of the original reformers.7

 

Elected leadership, supported by former elected and appointed city officials who were now citizens of Kansas City, and further supported by the media's editorial writers had brought about an overwhelming mandate from the citizens.  The message was to change a "comfortable" form of government for Kansas City, in order to try to achieve a higher level of leadership and accountability.

 

Accountability in local government is a recurrent theme throughout communities in the United States.  Whether it is dissatisfaction with the local public schools, or frustration at the inability of the city government to respond quickly to community concerns, there is increasing discussion of how to bring more accountability to these public systems.

 

The solution often proposed is to improve the system by instituting reforms such as total quality management, which helps organizations find ways to better focus their mission and attitude.  In addition, there has been, especially in recent years, a move to institute organizational measurement, such as outcome measures, indicators, and targets, as a way to gauge the improvement possible in the organization and to bring accountability.

 

Increasingly, the solution to our public system dissatisfaction is the proposal that it's time to change our existing form of local representative democracy.  Chicago's decision to put the public schools under Mayor Daley was a very visible move to make the Chicago School System more accountable.  That action has been followed in Cleveland, and more recently in Detroit.

 

Detroit Mayor Dennis Archer was given the authority by the Michigan State Legislature to appoint a new school board to replace the elected school board of the Detroit Public Schools.  During the legislative debate, protestors disrupted the Senate Committee hearing on the proposal.  Security was increased for additional hearings, and by April, the mayor was given the authority to proceed.  After swearing in the new appointed board at a late-night, hastily arranged ceremony, the mayor urged his new board that includes a college president, a deputy mayor, two business leaders, and a community activist to move forward:

 

"We don't need more studies.  We don't need endless debate.  We

don't need to invent everything.  And we don't need to delay once

the facts are in.  We need people who listen carefully, assess

critically and act promptly."1

 

At the first meeting of the newly appointed board, more than one thousand citizens were in attendance.  The crowd became more disruptive as the meeting went on, and the board chairman directed the police to remove the protestors. For the next twenty minutes, citizens were removed from the meeting by the police.

 

A recent report by the Education Commission of the States listed seventeen districts where a takeover of the school system had been accomplished or was underway.2  It is not just school systems where changes in local representative democracy are being contemplated. 

 

Every year, there are increasing efforts to change the council-manager form of local government in communities.  The major reason used to support such a change is the need to improve accountability in the local government in question.  The council-manager plan was introduced in the United States in the early part of this century to bring private sector practices and organization to the public's business.  Over the years, a cadre of professional managers has been trained to apply business principles to local government. Many have argued that their success in doing so has had the effect of making it more difficult for the public to feel engaged in civic issues.

 

Over the years, nearly every time a proposal for change in the form of local government came forward, the International City/County Management Association (ICMA), the professional association of city and county managers, would oppose the effort to abandon the council-manager plan.  ICMA's highly public efforts typically would involve professional administrators trying to convince people of the advantages of professional management.  They would point out the potential pitfalls of strong mayor or other forms of local government that many argue are more responsive to the citizens.

 

In an interesting recent development, the executive director of ICMA published a two-part message in the organization's magazine, Public Management.  The series was titled "Is it Time to Reform the Reform?"  The articles recount the history of the city manager movement and the increasing professionalization of not just the manager's office, but also the operating departments throughout the city and county organization.  The impact of this evolution in local government, with the increasing calls for elected executive leadership at the local level, are analyzed with great honesty by the professional association's lead staff member.

 

The Kansas City example showed how elected local government leaders, and former elected and appointed leaders, can lead an effort to bring about such a change.  The Cincinnati case study points to the importance of taking the time to include a large number of a community's citizens in a dialogue about the best achievable outcome. The new civic activists in Cincinnati have directly experienced the elation of bringing a large number of interests of diverse background to an agreed upon change.  Detroit, meanwhile, wrestles with the implementation of a structure change that was made more volatile because of its autocratic method of creation.

 

While communities can successfully change the structure of their representative government at the local level, it is in no way a simple task.  Quick actions without preparing the entire community can detour successfully accomplishing the goal.  The Detroit example clearly demonstrates what can occur in a community.  The Cincinnati case study, on the other hand, despite the low voter turnout, is a story of a successful merging of interests -- elected officials, citizen organizations, and media editorial viewpoint -- facilitated in this case by a diverse group of energetic, young civic activists.

 

1.      Ortiz, McConnell and van Moorlehem.  1999.  Archer tells new school board to listen, assess, act promptly.  Detroit Free Press, 2 April.

2.      Henry.  1999.  Wresting reins from failing schools.  USA Today, 30 March.

3.      Editorial: A strong mayor would benefit Kansas City.  1998.  Kansas City Star, 25 July.

4.      Hansell, “Is it time to ‘Reform’ the Reform?”  Public Management.  (December 1998)  15.

5.      Monk.  1999.  The new breed.  Business Courier, 12 March.

6.      Goldberg.  1998.  Reformers urge districts for council.  Cincinnati Enquirer, 19 June.

7.      Hansell, “Is it time to ‘Reform’ the Reform?”  Public Management.  (December 1998)  15.

8.      Hansell, “Reforming the Reform, Part 2.”  Public Management.  (January 1999)  28.

9.      Wilkinson.  1999.  Charterites back ‘strong mayor’ reform.  Cincinnati Enquirer, 24 February.

10.  Wilkinson.  1999.  Issue 4 divides interest groups.  Cincinnati Enquirer, 3 May.

11.  Osborne.  1999.  Strong mayor: Boss, or real city leadership?  Cincinnati Post, 1 May.

12.  Editorial: Direct election gives Cincinnati a leader.  1999.  Cincinnati Enquirer, 11 April.

13.  Rusk.  1999.  Inside Game/Outside Game.  Brookings Institution Press.  247.

14.  Michaud.  1999.  ‘Stronger-mayor’ here could set standard.  Cincinnati Enquirer, 4 April.

15.  Wilkinson.  1999.  Cincinnati voters opt for strong mayor.  Cincinnati Enquirer, 5 May.

16.  Monk.  1999.  The new breed.  Business Courier, 12 March.

 

The above is mostly background for what I am preparing to post later.

good stuff

Yea, great stuff Seth!

Implementation of Issue 4

What did Cincinnatians do when they approved Issue 4?  On paper, they changed the City of Cincinnati Municipal Code to now offer the Stronger Mayor a wide array of executive tools with which he may exercise his leadership capabilities. Serving a four year term, the Mayor has been given the power to appoint the vice Mayor and the chairs of all committees, both without the advice and consent of Council. The City Manager is also chosen by the Mayor from a wide pool of qualified applicants and is formally appointed by a simple majority vote of Council. If the political will arises for the removal of a sitting City Manager, a simple majority of Council is all that is needed to remove the City Manager. This removal is contingent upon the Mayor initiating the removal process as the Mayor alone possesses this power of initiation. The Mayor is also given a strong hand in legislative leadership as he has the power to set the agenda and to propose and introduce legislation for Council consideration. He also serves as the ceremonial head of the city and is recognized as the leader of the city by the Governor of Ohio for military and emergency purposes. The Mayor is also chosen in a separate “at-large” election from the Council and is therefore held responsible for the achievements and failures that occur within his administration. With this newly crafted municipal code, the Mayor has the potential to create a fully functional administration for the first time in over 75 years. Not only is the mayor now in the position of being the chief executive, he has the potential to be the chief legislator and directly works with the City Manager of virtually his choosing.20

 

Partisanship Revisited

 

But the necessity of a strong mayor in city hall hardly correlates with the flourishment of its city.  David Rusk uses the example of a mayor with consolidated power struggling against bigger than the office of mayor:

I am reminded of an experience in June 1996, when I was conducting a workshop in Gary (IN) for the Northwest Indiana Federation of Interfaith Organization…a familiar face dropped by.  It was Richard Hatcher, former mayor of Gary.  Hatcher had been the first African-American mayor of a major American city (1968-1988)…In my mind’s eye I recalled the youthful mayor, exuding optimism, energy, and confidence.27

Even when political power is concentrated in one constituency, betterment is not guaranteed.  Rusk is particularly interested in the dissolution of high poverty neighborhoods and describes  Mayor Hatcher’s legacy as follows:

Now that the black community has gained control of city hall, the mayor had said, we are going to turn Gary around.  We are going to make a difference.  Twenty years later, neither Mayor Hatcher nor his successors had really made a difference.28

 

For all the hope a consolidation of one party rule might bring, it vanquishes the best measure of accountability in American politics: the two-party system.  Partisan elections would increase accountability by vetting candidates who are most fit to serve and be the standard bearer for the party and also make the mayor more accountable to the party.  A two-party system can generate the competition that produces responsive, credible, competent, trustworthy, and reliable leaders.  Democracy, as a political system, requires conflict, competition, organization, leadership and responsibility.29

An investigation to the political composition of the Dayton City Commission and Cincinnati City Council may illustrate a correlation between political homogeneity and effective local government.  I contend that Cincinnati’s City Council with have a more diverse mix of political representation than the Dayton City Commission.30 

Since 1971 in Dayton, the mayor has been voted on separately from the other four City Commissioners.  Of those four seats, there have been forty-eight elections to fill the open positions.  Thirty-nine of the forty-eight openings have been filled with sixteen different Democrats.  Through 1973, four years after the mayor was elected separately from the commission, four of the openings were filled with nonpartisan politicians.  Since 1969, only one non-Democrat, Republican Abner Orick was elected to the City Commission.  Mr. Orick served a total of five terms.

The mayoralty of the city of Dayton has been held by five people since Dave Hall’s ® resignation on May 13, 1970.  Four of the five mayors since 1970 have been Democratic which translates to thirty-one of the thirty-eight years, one party has held, on average, over seventy-five percent of the elected political leadership in the city of Dayton.

Upon further examination, the Cincinnati City Council shows more political heterogeneity.  Since 1991, there have been eighty-one seats filled on the Cincinnati City Council.  Only forty-six of these seats have been filled by the Democratic Party while the remaining to political parties, the Republicans and Charterites, won twenty-one and thirteen seats respectively.  The eighty-first seat was filled by an independent candidate.  Therefore, since 1991, only fifty-six percent of the Cincinnati City Council has been controlled by the majority party as opposed to the super-majority in Dayton since 1970.

The disparity in political diversity may contribute to the frustration and anxiety of a city’s citizens to its detriment.  In her book, Governing the Ungovernable City, Barbara Ferman states “a major component of our institutional structure has been the two-party system.  A re-introduction of partisan elections would provide a mechanism of accountability that is currently lacking…As an institution, the party has a larger stake in long term survival that does the individual candidate.”31  The political party’s organizational needs encourage it to perform valuable screening and recruitment functions.  Without such screening, the chances for irresponsible individuals to enter and win elections is increased.32

While the professionalism and organization of the city manager movement continues to be relevant to municipal government, unconventional political leadership in the form of a strong executive elected by the people is also proving to be important in all of America’s most dynamic cities.

 

I find it hard to believe that "A re-introduction of partisan elections would provide a mechanism of accountability that is currently lacking…As an institution, the party has a larger stake in long term survival that does the individual candidate."  The Hamilton County Republican Party is a perfect case.  The party had a lock on local government, including City Government (though generally in coalition with the Charterites the case of the City) until the mid to late 1970s.  Now they don't even have control over the County Commission.  I'd argue that one of the main reasons for this is because the local Party at this time had virtually no influence over the platform of the nation Republican Committee, and that this platform was invariably anti-city.

 

Firstly, my work is not a defense or condemnation of either party.  Perhaps, "competitive" is a cleaner word than "partisan."  At the local level, the national agenda's shouldn't hold much (if any) sway.  Following that logic, usually leads people to say "what's political about paving roads and collecting refuse? We need managers, not politicians."  Those who said that, like the early reformers in the Progressive era, would be both right and wrong.  Cities need great management but contingent to great management is great leadership.

 

I think the case can be made that leadership is at its strongest when it is embodied in an ambitious individual who is personally invested in outcomes.  And those ambitious individuals (heroic leaders) seem to be more likely to enter the political fray out of a sense of urgency or duty and rarely out of a sense of entitlement or professional qualification.  They are citizen leaders who know what the people want because they come from them, not from the academy, the party, the union or the management.

LK is right. The Hamilton Cty. GOP used be to led (though in a rogue kind of way) by guys like Guy Guckenberger. The rise of Phil Heimlich was really the end of an urban GOP.

LK is right. The Hamilton Cty. GOP used be to led (though in a rogue kind of way) by guys like Guy Guckenberger. The rise of Phil Heimlich was really the end of an urban GOP.

What do you mean by this? I'm not familiar with Phil Heimlich.

Really?

How is it the end of the urban GOP? Aren't there different types of Dems/Reps depending on geography? Urban v rural v suburban?  Are you saying Heimlich killed the urban GOP?

I'm saying that a certain kind of reformist pro-urban Republican party used to exist in Cincinnati. From the 50s through the 80s there were many GOP politicians that did make it their business to oppose every idea that might be actually helpful to urban life. With Heimlich, the Hamilton Cty. GOP increasingly imbibed the anti-urban bias of the party as a whole (esp. the post-Gingrich revolution). Even Chabot was more pro-urban than Heimlich during his time on council during the 80s.

I think citizens are served best when there is healthy debate/engagement in the process. Usually that requires more than one "party" or "faction"...in Cincy they are lucky to also have the Charterites...in Dayton there is not much competition so there isn't much accountabilty.  Ultimately this is the citizens fault for not challenging the 'leadership'. The guy with the power (city manager) is a professional chugging away at his job that (unfortunately) isn't emotionally tied to the community like a mayor is.

I find it hard to believe that "A re-introduction of partisan elections would provide a mechanism of accountability that is currently lacking…As an institution, the party has a larger stake in long term survival that does the individual candidate."  The Hamilton County Republican Party is a perfect case.  The party had a lock on local government, including City Government (though generally in coalition with the Charterites the case of the City) until the mid to late 1970s.  Now they don't even have control over the County Commission.  I'd argue that one of the main reasons for this is because the local Party at this time had virtually no influence over the platform of the nation Republican Committee, and that this platform was invariably anti-city.

 

Firstly, my work is not a defense or condemnation of either party.  Perhaps, "competitive" is a cleaner word than "partisan."  At the local level, the national agenda's shouldn't hold much (if any) sway.  Following that logic, usually leads people to say "what's political about paving roads and collecting refuse? We need managers, not politicians."  Those who said that, like the early reformers in the Progressive era, would be both right and wrong.  Cities need great management but contingent to great management is great leadership.

 

I think the case can be made that leadership is at its strongest when it is embodied in an ambitious individual who is personally invested in outcomes.  And those ambitious individuals (heroic leaders) seem to be more likely to enter the political fray out of a sense of urgency or duty and rarely out of a sense of entitlement or professional qualification.  They are citizen leaders who know what the people want because they come from them, not from the academy, the party, the union or the management.

Things are happening in Dayton....this is perhaps the most poorly written article from the DDN in awhile.  The last line mentions "Riordan" without ever referencing his position as City Manager and it references the "Republic party."  DDN, come on!

 

 

Republicans want Dayton to be led by full-time mayor

By Lucas Sullivan, Staff Writer 

Updated 11:13 PM Wednesday, September 1, 2010

 

DAYTON — The chairman of the Montgomery County Republican Party is leading a charge to change Dayton’s city charter to allow for a full-time mayor form of government and abandon the city manager structure that has been in place for decades, according to a high-ranking Republic party official.

 

The Dayton Daily News has learned Greg Gantt plans to help organize the collection of about 10,000 signatures from registered voters in the city necessary to get the issue on a ballot for voters’ approval by as early as next year, though he has yet to formally ask for the petitions.

 

Voters must approve any change to the city charter.

 

Gantt was contacted several times for this story, but declined to comment through a third party.

 

more: http://www.daytondailynews.com/news/dayton-news/republicans-want-dayton-to-be-led-by-full-time-mayor-893561.html